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namaste – A history

Namaste (nah-mah-STAY) is a Hindi word meaning, the
Spirit in me meets the same Spirit in you. It is a South
Asian greeting, originating in India that is used for hello
and goodbye. The greeting is commonly accompanied
by a slight bow made with the hands pressed together,
palms touching, in front of the chest. This is a well-recognized symbolic gesture in which one hand represents
the higher, spiritual nature, while the other represents
the worldly self. By combining the two, the person
making the gesture is attempting to rise above their
differences with others, and connect themselves to the
person he/she bows to. The bow is symbolic of love
and respect.
This journal is meant to promote the study of human
rights at the University of Connecticut and is to serve
as a venue for recognizing and displaying great academic
achievements of both undergraduate and graduate
students in this field of study.
Recognizing the work being done within the human
rights community at UConn will foster an environment that promotes mutual respect. More than that, it
is hoped that this ideal will be embraced by university
community members and translated in various ways and
works to the larger global community.
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foreword

This inaugural issue of Namaste, which is edited and produced entirely by undergraduate students at the University of Connecticut, is
made possible by a grant from the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center
in honor of the 10th anniversary of its founding at the University of
Connecticut. The dedication of the Center in October 1995 began
a process that over the next ten years has established the University of Connecticut as an internationally known center for human
rights scholarship, education, and outreach. As part of its academic
program in human rights, the University established an undergraduate human rights minor which continues to attract a growing number
of students.
In conjunction with other 10th anniversary celebratory events,
several University faculty organized a Human Rights Essay and
Creative Writing Contest for undergraduate students. The work of
the student winners is featured in this volume. It is fitting that the
celebratory events of a Research Center dedicated to preserving
the archives of those who have fought for human rights in the past
include a tribute to the work of the next generation of individuals
who will fight for global justice. It has been gratifying to witness the
enthusiasm, initiative, and dedication of the student editors and producers of this volume. They are busy putting ideas into action.
With great hope for the future,
Anne L. Hiskes
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Storrs, Connecticut
April 2, 2006
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j . michael tower

Palestinian female suicide bombers:
a new nationalism, a new feminism,
or a new exploitation
(December 2005)

about michael

Michael is an undergraduate at the University of Connecticut studying Women’s Studies and Sociology, class
of 2006. Michael’s research interests center around
women’s access to institutions of power and masculinity studies. He was a One Year Visiting Student in the
sociology department at Trinity College in Dublin,
Ireland when he wrote the essay included in this volume.
Michael will be attending Social Work graduate school in
the fall of 2006.
The emergence of Palestinian female suicide bombers
radically redefined the role of women in the nationalist struggle for Palestinian statehood and the fight for
women’s equality. Is women’s martyrdom the paradigm
for gender equality and women’s commitment to the
nationalist struggle, as Islamic fundamentalists allege?
To assess the claim, this essay places the rise of the
Palestinian female suicide bomber within a 30 – year
history of grassroots activism by Women’s Committees,
gender relations in the first and second intifada, and
growth of the Islamic fundamentalist movement at the
end of the 20th century. These elements are linked to
the life circumstances behind each martyrdom to reveal
the external influences and internal motivations behind
each woman’s choice to commit suicide. This historical
analysis reveals a coercive patriarchal influence involved
in the promotion of women’s martyrdom and casts severe doubt on the libratory nature of Palestinian female
suicide bombers.
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Wafa Idris slept in on Sunday, January 27th, 2002. Buying her niece
a glass of fruit juice on her way out of her Palestinian hometown, she
headed to Jerusalem layered in explosives. Dressed in a Western
style coat with long flowing hair and manicured nails, she looked like
just another tourist shopping for shoes in east Jerusalem. In a flash
of light and explosion of flesh, Idris began a new chapter in women’s
historical fight for social liberation in the Palestinian state. Since then
a heroic appreciation of female suicide bombers emerged in certain
segments of the Palestinian population. To discuss the implications
of this on women’s liberation and national liberation, I will trace the
efforts and strategies of the women’s movement over the past 30
years by concentrating on patriarchal institutional involvement and
grassroots activism. I will further discuss how the ideology of the
female suicide bomber is constructed by fundamentalists as both
socially and nationally liberationist for the women involved. I will
conclude by discussing how the mechanisms behind women’s martyrdom actually reinforce traditional gender hierarchies and hinder the
development of social liberation for women of Palestine.
women’s committees of the

1970’s and 80’s
The first women’s committee, the Women’s Work Committee
(WWC) was established following the International Women’s
Day conference in 1978. Women had been active in the nationalist
struggle for years, but the formation of the WWC refocused women’s activism to their own gender oppression within their occupied
territories. As its mission stated, the WWC sought “improvement
in women’s political, economic, social, and cultural status as part of
the process of liberation from all forms of exploitation.”1 The activist
women recognized that women’s lives would improve little if Israeli
oppressive force were simply replaced by patriarchal tyranny under a
Palestinian state. The educated, upper class women who constituted
the WWC early groups made efforts to transcend their class privilege. They began by focusing on the development programs for the
vast majority of Palestinian women who lived in villages and refugee
camps with the most severe gender oppression. In the early 1980’s,
the WWC fractured into four distinct committees, each corresponding to a faction within the PLO, or Palestinian
Liberation Organization.
The fragmentation of the women’s movement was a mixed result
for the development of a women’s consciousness in Palestine. While
more women’s committees enabled greater outreach and education
to the population, ideological differences created a schism among the
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committees. The primary issue that caused strife was in many ways
the most important these groups dealt with: should women’s liberation be a constant feature of national liberation, or should nationalist
interests supercede the fight for gender equality?
The four major women’s committees were not indifferent to these
fundamental approaches in the functioning of their organizations.
Two groups believed women’s liberation must go hand in hand with
national liberation, another believed that gender issues need to take
a back seat to nationalist priorities, and yet another believed that
social equality would inevitably accompany national liberation on its
own. These and other ideological differences often placed women’s
groups with oppositional attitudes toward one another. Committees wasted precious resources competing against each other to
establish day care centers in the same community. Some observers
of the women’s committees in the early 1980’s argue that the leaders
of the four women’s committees seemed to have more in common
with the men in their respective PLO factions than with each other.
In spite of the divisions among the groups, the committees achieved
significant success promoting women’s liberation in the years leading
up to the first Intifada.
Each women’s committee mobilized outreach efforts to assist rural
women bound by domesticity and urban women encountering wage,
vacation, and other issues. Conceptually, social liberation gained
distinction from national liberation as the achievement of “women’s
spaces” in the committees spurred initial discussions for women to
explore their gender oppression. Interventions within rural communities enabled women to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency and
accomplishment outside the home. However, the real achievement
of the women’s committees was more fundamental.
The women’s committees in the 1980’s managed an important balance between grassroots involvement and inclusion with patriarchal
decision-making organizations such as the PLO. Women’s groups
never wholly depended on the institutions of the patriarchy for
accomplishing steps towards women’s liberation. While the committees were tied to the PLO at the higher levels, women developed
and implemented their own strategies. Women themselves created
the operational models for their committee structure, conducted
their own research into rural women’s needs, and formulated
outreach programs on their own terms. Committee leaders and
rural women who participated in the training programs took their
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new skills and operational knowledge to the nationalist struggle in
December 1987, with the first intifada.
palestinian women in the first intifada

Responding to decades of abuse by the Israeli military, Palestinian
society mobilized a spontaneous, massive resistance movement with
the intifada of 1987. Palestinian women stepped into the nationalist
domain, joining men in protesting, violating curfews and closures, and
physically confronting Israeli armed forces. Women’s committees
stepped to the fore, using their years of organizational experience
to coordinate demonstrations, continue the education of children,
and cultivating crops no longer available during the boycott of Israeli
goods. “Behold our women,” one revolutionary booklet proclaimed,
“a fighting force comparable to that of our men.” With their husbands imprisoned or confined by curfews, women assumed responsibility for heading up households, running family businesses, and other
roles traditionally limited to patriarchal privilege. The freedoms many
women experienced in the early intifada helped them to understand
that without social liberation, national liberation would be meaningless in the lives of Palestinian women. This tragic instance of women
being heaved back into the domestic sphere following a hard fought
struggle for nationhood, made Palestinian women promise themselves not to become “another Algeria.”
Chaotic social upheavals, such as the Intifada, often destabilize
gender roles in order to mount an effective resistance movement.
However, once the initial period of excitement passes, societies typically return to familiar hierarchies to reassert order and stability into
their lives once more. Rema Hammami argues that the emergence of
popular committees months after the beginning of the first Intifada
initiated this return of women into the domestic sphere. Another
source of public exclusion for women came from the growing influence of Islamicists in Palestine.
The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in the Early Intifada
Several months after the intifada began, attitudes in the streets of
the Occupied Territories shifted as Palestinians realized that in spite
of the intense struggle and personal sacrifice made by virtually all
in the collective resistance, little concrete advancement was made
towards the nationalist goal. Fundamentalist voices blamed the
inefficacy of the intifada on a loss of religious principles. Hamas and
others offered religious fundamentalism as the solution to achieving the nationalist goal. More importantly, Hamas offered Gaza the
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region suffering the most brutality, personal hardship, health care
and other services in exchange for religious adherence. Fundamentalism quickly gained popularity in Gaza, and traditional gender
roles were reasserted as Hamas ordered women to veil and men
to retake the sole responsibility of the public nationalist struggle.
Prior to the veiling requirement, many Palestinian women veiled out
of personal choice. However, coercive veiling enforced by Hamas
attacks represented a significant backlash against the autonomy
of women. Neither the newly formed Women’s Higher Council
(WHC), a representative body of all women’s committees, nor the
individual committees themselves, dealt effectively with the danger
imposed by early fundamentalist impositions on women. In fact there
was little political opposition to the fundamentalist uprising, fearing
that factionalism within the Palestinian resistance movement was just
what Israel hoped for. As a result, voices promoting the importance
of women’s equality and national liberation were effectively silenced.
It should be noted that women’s committees never politically
established women’s role in the early Intifada, which was a significant opportunity to reorder gender roles . Women’s participation
before and after the fundamentalist backlash of the first intifada was
consistently within the proscribed boundaries of patriarchal institutions. This caused women to never directly challenge the system
promoting women’s subservience. Additionally, the WHC did little to
create a unified women’s agenda in the face of an increasingly hostile
fundamentalist environment. Also many other women’s committees
were complicit in allowing social liberation to take a back seat to the
nationalist struggle.
Women’s progressive role in the early Intifada never achieved a
systematic reconceptualization of gender in Palestinian society. However, many scholars argue that the women’s violent exclusion and
sudden return to domesticity highlighted the disadvantages attendant
to traditional Palestinian womanhood, and a broad based women’s
consciousness, a Palestinian feminism, finally emerged.
women’s centers: non - patriarchal routes to social liberation

During the fundamentalist backlash of the 1990’s, Palestinian
women began to work outside of patriarchal power structures for
the nationalist cause, developing the tools for social liberation in
anticipation of new Palestinian state. The four women’s committees
continued to work separately in the villages and urban areas of the
Occupied Territories. They helped organize women into co-op-
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eratives, producing foodstuffs, clothing, and other goods usually
bought from Israelis. Women developed useful skills and a degree
of economic independence through their participation in production co-ops . Concurrently, the women’s movement continued to
establish alternative means of achieving equality through the creation
of women’s centers throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The women’s centers provided space for women to network, understand their oppression, and formulate strategies to undermine it.
The first of the centers, the Women’s Affairs Center, concentrated
on providing job training (literacy, vocational instruction, computer
training) and research into Palestinian gender oppression. Other centers concentrated on consciousness-raising efforts, such as holding
lectures on violence against women, women’s health, and women in
social change. These centers were prevalent in towns throughout the
Occupied Territories and provided safe spaces for women to plan for
their social liberation. The Bisan Center for Research and Development, founded in 1990, began to address some of the classist structural issues in the women’s movement by “bridging the gap between
women active in the grassroots movement and the female academics
and professionals.” Feminist thought reached greater populations and
the women’s movement broadened as rural women interacted with
urban professionals and academic formulating strategies for gender
liberation.
As women’s voices were strengthened by the establishment of the
centers, Palestinian leaders objected to women raising “peripheral”
gender issues during a time of nationalist struggle. Women committees and centers persisted by using workshops and lectures
to engage the public with issues of domestic violence. Also they
provided hotlines and shelters to help women confront their oppression. These and other initiatives drove gender issues into the public
discourse, working towards the “empowerment of women through
gender awareness.” Women’s centers and committees continued to
work outside the bounds of the patriarchy until 1994 with the signing
of the Oslo Accords.
shifting priorities: patriarchal inclusion and losing touch with the
grass rooots

In 1994, Palestinian leaders gathered together to form the framework for the Palestinian Authority and draft the Basic Law to act as a
temporary constitution until a permanent state was formed. Women
activists secured the creation of the Women’s Affairs Technical Com-
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mittee, a quasi-governmental organization responsible for drafting a
Women’s Bill of Rights for use in the eventual creation of a Palestinian state. Members of the women’s committees, the General Union
of Palestinian Women, and independent feminists were included
in discussions to give the document a broad base of support. The
Women’s Bill of Rights grounded its authority in the United Nations Convention to End Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
achieving a distinctly feminist quality. However, this concentration on
institutional participation led women’s groups to abandon grass roots
involvement.
During this formative stage of the Palestinian statehood, women
attempted to establish a strong presence as a model for future gender-inclusive operations. It was vitally important for women to assert
their voices, however, during the process, women’s committees lost
their connection to the grassroots and became enwrapped in the
restraints of patriarchy. Co-ops in small communities disbanded,
literacy programs lost funding, and women’s centers withdrew support for child-care centers. Activist women became more concerned
with processes of patriarchal inclusion and representation than with
the continued programmatic support of women throughout the Occupied Territories.
In the 1980’s and early 90’s, women’s committees traditionally
provided a lot of the charitable support in hard hit regions like the
Gaza Strip. They provided medical care while administering food
production/distribution programs to relieve the desperation caused
by the Israeli Occupation and the turmoil of the intifada. Having drastic consequences, as women’s committee’s ceased their community
involvement, fundamentalist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad
stepped into the vacuum. Funded by Syria and Iran, Islamicists used
charity to win the hearts and minds of Palestinians. Fundamentalism became not only a way to provide for one’s family, but religiosity
became a sacred form of political resistance and an expression of
nationalism. Within this context came the rise of the female suicide
bomber in 2002.
the women’s movement and the female suicide bomber

Following the suicide bombing death of Wafa Idris, fundamentalist
organizations seized upon the idea that women should again take up
the nationalist struggle through direct, violent means. Sheik Hassin, spiritual guide to Hamas, offered a unique religious reward to
encourage women to take part in suicide bombing:
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If they are not married they are guaranteed a pure husband in Paradise, and of course they are entitled to bring seventy of their relatives
to join them there without suffering the anguish of death.
Fundamentalists were offering women a privilege they had previously stripped from them in the early intifada – membership in
the nationalistic struggle. The Palestinian leadership reinforced the
nationalist implications of female martyrdom. One of them eulogizing
Idris, declared, “Wafa’s martyrdom restored honor to the national
role of the Palestinian woman, sketched the most wonderful pictures
of heroism in the long battle for national liberation.” Using women
as a symbol of the nation, Islamicists called up on women to assert
their nationalism through violent action. Images of the heroic female
martyr permeated the media, constructing martyrdom and acts of
violence by women as proof of their commitment to securing Palestinian statehood. Just as the rise of an ideology of female martyrs
was nationalistic in purpose, it was constructed as socially liberating
as well.
In a strange twist of circumstance, fundamentalists offer the reward
that women’s groups have been fighting a century for – social liberation. Or at least their definition of it. Since the early backlash in the
first Intifada, fundamentalist groups have been responsible for reproducing the subjugation of women to the men in their lives. Ironically,
the ideology of the female suicide bomber constructed by the same
Islamicists, capitalizes on women’s desire to be free from this subordination. The persuasiveness of these arguments is revealed in the
attitudes of some Palestinian women. According to one woman who
failed in her bombing attempt, women’s martyrdom is “definitely a
step forward for equality for women throughout the Arab world”
because if women are able to fight and die like men, that indicates
significant progress toward gender equality. With women’s groups no
longer doing much activist work in towns and villages, fundamentalists have taken their place and constructed martyrdom, instead of
self-sufficiency, as the route to gender equality. In order to understand the truly deceptive nature of the fundamentalists’ “gender
equality,” few key circumstances that motivate women to become
martyrs, should be taken into account
the mechanisms behind women’s martyrdom

Militant groups target Palestinian women who are particularly vulnerable in their personal lives. Wafa Idris, her mother explains, found
herself in such a situation. “My daughter’s husband divorced her because she couldn’t have children. Wafa knew she could never marry
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again because a divorced woman is tainted…She was young, intelligent, and beautiful and had nothing to live for.” (emphasis added)
Reading the biographical notes on other women suicide bombers,
one consistently finds evidence of gender related baggage. These
women are even raped to make them vulnerable . In every case
of suicide bombing, a father, brother, uncle, or close family friend
– always male – has played a central role in convincing the women
that suicide is the only honorable recourse . Women martyrs are not
spontaneous expressions of nationalist rage – they are the result of
calculated, managed recruitment efforts by fundamentalists to use
downtrodden women as military weapons.
In conclusion, women’s martyrdom is the latest redefinition of
women’s role and reflects negatively on women’s status in the social
and nationalistic landscape in Palestine. Women martyrs, and fundamentalists groups creating them, attempted to insert themselves
into the void of women’s groups who are losing touch with the grass
roots in Gaza. Fundamentalists have attempted to assert their own
version of “feminism,” to serve their own military interests. A true
Palestinian gender equality demands self-determination for women,
not the freedom to do “manly” things. Fundamentalists have only
established another set of standards by which Muslim women are to
be judged and punished. Basically, as long as fundamentalist men have
the power to define feminism and “equality” for women, Palestine
will never achieve true gender equality.
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megan mcdonald

Claiming their rights: a social movement by and
for children

about megan

Megan McDonald graduated cum laude from UCONN
in May of 2005 with a degree in Political Science and
a minor in Human Rights. She interned at the Human
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worked at the Office of the Attorney General. She was
Vice President of Amnesty International, Vice President
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Currently, Megan is a first year student at Pace University School of Law and is pursuing Children’s Rights
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She is co-chair of the Public Interest Law Scholarship
Organization’s Silent Auction Committee, Treasurer of
the Women’s Association of Law Students and a member of Phi Alpha Delta.
This paper was awarded second place in the Dodd
Center Human Rights Writing Competition and the
Economic Rights Poster Contest.

melissa h. shippee

drawing, 2006

Two random events (detail)

The concept of human rights is a highly contentious aspect of international politics. The focus has historically been on human rights
as a whole, but in recent years children’s rights have entered the
spotlight. In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
was finalized. Soon after coming into force in 1990, it became the
most ratified convention in United Nations’ history. The document
protects children from a multitude of harms by outlining the specific
rights to which children are entitled. Among these rights are the
right to education (Article 28 states that primary education must be
compulsory and free for all) and the right to protection from child
labor (Article 32 states that there should be a minimum age for employment). Following this triumph of the children’s rights movement,
another movement emerged--one directly contradicting (wording?)
many of the rights outlined in the CRC itself, yet using Article 12 as a
main point of argument. Article 12 states that children have a right to
express their views about matters that affect them. This new movement is a movement not only for children but by children.
A social movement is composed of three main elements. First, there
must be a political opportunity structure, or a critical opening which
allows a trigger for change. This opportunity certainly opened for
working children with the advent of the children’s rights movement.
The CRC and the ensuing focus on children’s rights allowed the
working children to have a place in the discussion about their rights.
The African Movement of Working Children and Youth (AMWCY)
formally established themselves in 1994. The second main element
necessary for a social movement to emerge is a mobilizing structure,
or a network of people put into action to create change. Remarkably, the children created this structure almost entirely on their own.
Though grassroots groups of working children began to form in different areas, they remained in communication through conferences
and other events. Finally, framing--the act of naming wrongs and
claiming rights--is central to social movement evolution. These children have achieved this aspect of social movement development in a
most powerful manner. With reference to documents that are supposed to protect them, the working children have carefully outlined
aspects that they argue infringe on their rights and do more harm
than good. tFurther, they have outlined precisely what rights they feel
they are entitled to and specified which forms of labor are acceptable to them. Through integration of these three crucial elements,
the working children have emerged as a valid social movement.
The Working Children’s Movement spread to several areas where
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child labor is the reality of life for many children who are economically tied to the practice, and who resent adults telling them that
they cannot work, when they need to. Children from Africa, India,
and Latin America challenged the creators of the CRC and other
children’s rights documents, demanding their voices be heard when
it comes to decisions made on their behalf. They maintain that their
right to work should not be limited by adults, especially when their
own opinions are not taken into account. This movement by children
has caused many children’s rights advocates to reexamine their own
ideas about child labor, causing controversy within the children’s
rights movement at large.
The Working Children’s Movement can be traced to the establishment of the AMWCY in 1994, when the founders of the movement
not only identified 12 rights to help them eliminate exploitation and
the worst forms of child labor, but also set up a plan for promoting
those rights. The rights include the right to learn a trade and participate in light and limited work. Children involved in this movement
concentrated on their own experiences in determining the most
important protections that they needed, some that are ignored
completely by adult “advocates”. Taking the development of these
rights into their own hands demonstrated that the children were in
fact quite serious about being heard as a movement.
The movement further progressed in 1997 in Oslo, when four young
activists walked out of an international NGO meeting connected to
the World Summit on Child Labor wearing gags on their mouths to
demonstrate the way they felt the adults viewed them. These young
activists believed that the adults in the meeting were ignoring their
thoughts and not letting them speak. Greeted by the press outside
of the meeting, they presented their agenda to improve conditions
for working children.
One of these activists was a representative of the “Movement of
Working Boys, Girls and Adolescents of Nicaragua (NATRAS) -- an
advocacy organization that provides support services for working
children.” This organization is funded through Save the Children
Canada and has been credited with developing special curricula
designed with working children in mind. One organization affiliated
with NATRAS, La Fundacion “La Verde Sonrisa”, stated its goal to
provide education for children that includes not only academics, but
skill training in areas such as carpentry and baking as well. Programs
like these demonstrate that while the children need to work, they
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also want to go to school, provided they learn beneficial skills.
This revolutionary children’s rights movement spread to many other
countries in addition to Nicaragua. A much larger group formed
in Latin America and the Caribbean at large, calling itself the Latin
American and Caribbean Movement of Working Children and Adolescent, or MOLACNATS. This movement exists in approximately
fifteen countries. In addition to the Latin American movement,
multiple movements exist in India. The Indian Working Children’s
Movement is composed of ten working children’s organizations from
central and southern India. A Working Children’s Syndicate is being
formed in the northern part of India, where an organization known
as Ballah Mazdoor organizes independent working children typically threatened by the dangers of the streets. Clearly, the working
children’s movement is not one that can be ignored, nor is it going
away. These individual movements from country to country are
all bound together tightly and remain in communication with each
other. For many, this solidarity began in 1996 when an international
meeting took place in Kundapur, India.
The first International Meeting of Working Children, held in India in
1996, consisted of twenty-nine working child delegates from Asia,
Latin America and Africa and produced ten points of consensus,
referred to as The Kundapur Declaration. Within the declaration, the
children outlined the points they considered most important to the
core of the movement, including that they “are against the boycott
of products made by children, want an education system that is
adapted to [their] reality and capabilities [and] are against exploitation at work but…are for work with dignity with hours adapted so
that [they] have time for education and leisure”. These points utilized
some articles from the CRC, such as the articles granting time for leisure and education, but made an important distinction about work.
The children made it clear that, while they would not be exploited,
they had the right to work and earn a living.
They also determined that they, the Working Children and Youth
Movements, must always be consulted about decisions concerning
child work. To facilitate cooperation and reinforce their solidarity,
they later created an International Co-ordination of Working Children Movements. As a group, they have participated in numerous
conferences on child labor and children’s rights, which significantly
increased their power and visibility. The meeting at Oslo, which
sparked international attention following the walk out by gagged child
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delegates, is just one example of how this movement has increased
attention towards its goals.
In 2000, at the 5th Meeting of the AMWCY, the Working Children’s
Movement achieved yet another success when they participated in a
debate with the Regional Director of UNICEF. This debate led her to
agree to “support the AMWCY, within the limits of available means
and of her mandate”. Support from UNICEF demonstrated just how
far the children in the movement had carried their message and signified the realization by adults that children must be further incorporated into the decision-making process. The children at the conference concluded by declaring the changes they had made to the state
of their rights, saying that, “In places where we are organized, our
12 rights have considerably progressed for us and for other Working Children and Youth”. Arguably, they have been as effective in
promoting their rights and advancing their mission as many politically
driven conventions and doctrines developed by adults.
In 2004, at the 2nd Meeting of the World Movement of Working Children and Adolescents in Berlin, child workers from around
the world gathered again to voice their concerns and state their
achievements. Too often, adults ignore all that children have to teach
and concentrate solely on what they have to learn, something that
people realized at this meeting. At this meeting, the children once
again made the distinction between work that is suitable for them
and that which is unacceptable, or that exploits them. Perhaps the
most important statement made in the final declaration of the meeting was one aimed at the International Labor Organization (ILO), in
which the child workers denounced “the policies of the ILO that aim
at abolishing children’s work. The ILO has failed to understand the
realities of working children and the viable alternatives to exploitative labor”.
In 1999, the ILO established Convention 182 on the worst forms of
child labor, mandating that all members who signed the Convention
took measures to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. As the
working children agree, the worst forms of child labor are prostitution, slavery, drug trafficking and work, which, “by its nature…is likely
to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” Still, though, the
ILO has larger aims to completely eradicate child labor, proclaiming
it a “global cause” on their website. This conflicts with the message
of the working children, who concluded the final declaration of their
second meeting with the mantra, “Yes to Dignified Work-No to Ex-
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ploitation Because We Are Not Part of the Problem But Part of the
Solution So That Our Voice Be Heard in the Whole World,” further
frustrating cooperation between the two groups. By pointing out to
the ILO the paradox of calling for the elimination of all child labor
when ILO 182 sets a rubric for distinguishing between various forms
of child labor, the child workers point out a problem of generalization they view as very detrimental to their overall well being.
People outside the movement see this inconsistency as well.
UNESCO journalist Sophie Boukhari feels that the ILO and UNICEF have been forced to recognize that abolishing child labor only
pushes children into more dangerous jobs, such as prostitution. Still,
Boukhari points out the ambiguity behind the UN’s viewpoint on
child labor and its position on the movement of working children
in general, saying that, “The UN recognizes it is unrealistic and
dangerous to want to abolish child labor…But the UN continues
to campaign for abolition.” UNICEF, while sometimes seeming to
support the Working Children’s Movement, “‘is strongly urging the
World Trade Organization to adopt a ‘social clause’,’ which would
require minimum standards from companies, including a ban on child
labor.” It is this “flip-flopping” that continues to confuse the world
and frustrate the Working Children’s Movement about what is in the
true “best interest” of the children on whose behalf these decisions
are being made.
While substantial information in support of the movement abounds,
criticism of the movement is not widely published. One highly respected academic in the field of child labor, William Myers, believes
the reasoning behind this is quite obvious. “Who is going to go on
record in full print attacking kids? They probably would risk losing
more than they would gain by being perceived as anti-child”. Instead
of directly criticizing the Working Children’s Movement, criticism
tends to be disguised.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU,
founded in 1949, has over 200 affiliated organizations in 154 countries, and believes that no child should be deprived of an education
or a childhood. The ICFTU encourages strict adherence to international conventions on labor standards, especially those made by the
ILO. The ICFTU works closely with the ILO and membership is open
only to trade unions structured democratically and immune from
outside influence. Campaigns by the ICFTU cover a variety of issues
related to labor rights, including “the respect and defense of trade
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union and workers’ rights, the eradication of forced and child labor…
[and] encouraging the organization of young workers.”
Interestingly, the ICFTU counts one of their campaigns as organizing youth workers, but another as eradicating child labor. The small
differentiations the ICFTU makes between child and youth workers
may seem significant to them – but the actual child workers see this
discrepancy as arbitrary, detrimental to their well being, and a clear
violation of their right to work to survive.
The claim that abolishing child labor is a matter of political will largely
oversimplifies the problem as something that can be ended simply
by making it illegal. In fact, the idea that child labor and all of the
problems that accompany it will disappear once a country makes the
practice illegal is akin to saying that poverty will be eradicated if a
country’s government uses political will to make poverty illegal. Not
only does this idea neglect that economic measures must be taken to
eradicate poverty; it does not answer the question of where all the
poor people would go. If they knew that they would be in trouble for
being poor, they would have to hide their poverty. Likewise, children
who are unable to get work through conventional methods would be
forced to turn to illegal and exploitative means of income, those that
are outlawed under ILO Convention 182.
Perhaps the most compelling example of why abolishing child labor
simply does not solve the problem can be found with the consequences of the Harkin Bill. United States Senator Harkin sponsored
the ‘Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1992’, a bill that proposed the
prohibition of U.S. imports made by children and an international
ban on products made from child labor. In Bangladesh (a likely first
target, were the bill to have become law), an estimated 50,000
working children were fired. This caused the recently fired children
to turn to much more dangerous and exploitive means of work,
with some children begging on the streets or turning to prostitution.
Many scholars caution that substantial damage can be done when
Northern ideals are imposed on the Southern countries, citing the
Bangladesh case as “a warning about the consequences of simplistically applying rich-country assumptions and remedies to poor-country situations without adequate attention to differences of social and
economic context.”
By following an abolitionist approach to child labor instead of a
regulative approach, the ICFTU seeks to eradicate child labor instead
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of providing children with protection through better working conditions, which would be far more effective to the lives of the world’s
working children. The ICFTU does not appreciate the economic
hardships that would be placed upon working children and their
families if child labor were made illegal. Also, they do not recognize
that the former child workers, in an attempt to find another source
of income, will turn to illegal, unregulated jobs (such as prostitution)
in order to survive. It makes far more sense to create legislation that
would protect the children from being exploited, such as limiting the
number of hours they can work and allotting time for school and
play, than to make work illegal altogether, thereby ensuring that the
children will turn to far more dangerous jobs to make up their lost
income. The ICFTU believes that work combined with education is
not sufficient. This directly contradicts the beliefs of the Working
Children’s Movement as a whole – that children desire an education
in addition to the freedom to work so that their daily lives actually
contribute in a positive way to their futures without neglecting their
needs at the present time – and ignores the warnings of experts in
the field.
The ‘labor market perspective’ accompanies the abolitionist approach and has been proven to be more detrimental than beneficial
to the lives of child workers, placing the interests of adults over those
of children and ignoring the reality of children’s situations-- that they
need to work in order to survive. This perspective is concerned with
the impact child labor has on adult labor. A particular viewpoint of
children goes along with this perspective, drawing upon the Western idea of childhood as a work-free time of life and the concept
that children are “essentially innocent, ignorant of the world and
incompetent to fend off its evils or even to recognize their own best
interest.”
Another organization vehemently opposed to the Working Children’s Movement is the Global March against Child Labor, whose
main objective lies in enforcing and expanding existing child labor
laws. The Global March movement began when a group of people
committed to ending child labor marched to the ILO Conference
in Geneva, where ILO 182 was drafted. While the working children
agree with ILO 182, the Global March can be seen as an opposing
force to the Working Children’s Movement, describing one of its
objectives as eradicating child labor. When members of the Working
Children’s Movement met in 1998, they announced that they would
not “participate in the Global March against Child Labour because
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it’s organisers refused to involve us and because we cannot march
against our own work” .
One of the risks of the Global March is that it over generalizes child
labor as slave labor, stating that it is a “movement born out of hope
and the need felt by thousands of people across the globe-the desire
to set children free from servitude”. The fact of the matter is not
only do child workers distinguish between child labor and slavery, the
ILO does so as well with ILO 182, naming slavery as one of the worst
forms of child labor.
The opposition movements above represent the historical response
to child labor – campaigning for prohibitions against the practice of
child labor in general. This is generally reached with a combination
of abolitionist and protectionist (regulative) approaches mentioned
above. The abolitionist portion involves fixing a minimum age for
children to become employed while the protectionist piece involves
legislation with an additional age for the employment of young
people, generally specifying the number of hours and the type of
jobs this group of people can participate in. This can be seen in the
United States with the minimum age for employment set at 15 and
restrictions placed on young people between the ages of 15 and 18.
The problem with this approach is that it is rarely enforced and may
in fact be unenforceable. Many scholars hold that the way to fix
the problem of child labor is not through compulsory education or
labor legislation, instead arguing that the most important factor is,
and always has been, family income. From the point of view of this
school of thought, abolishing child labor will not fix the problem; the
only way to fix the problem is for a country to become developed
enough for families to have enough money without their children’s
income supplementing their own.
Ben White, a scholar in the field of child labor, believes that the
employment of children is not in itself a problem; the “real problem
is not in the age but in the fact that young workers are often subject
to exaggerated forms of labor control and exploitation beyond
those faced by adults because of the way society treats young
people. Intervention groups seeking abolition, like Global March
and ICFTU, utilize an approach that may in fact make the child labor
problem worse. The reason that people turn towards the abolitionist
approach is because they deny the ability of children to make their
own decisions and to know what is best for their own lives – largely
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because the “prevailing view of childhood itself has seen children
as passive victims and appropriate objects of external intervention,
rather than as social subjects or agents of change, capable of both
claiming and exercising rights.” Above all, the focus needs to be on
understanding the reasons for and problems of child employment,
not on eradicating it entirely. To achieve this aim, intervention groups
need to “support the efforts of working children in trying to improve
the conditions of life and work.”
In 1987, the Indonesian government realized the validity of regulative measures and issued the ‘Ministerial Regulation for Protection
of Children who are Compelled to Work’ which recognized that
there were certain social-economic conditions that required children
below the minimum age to work and stipulated certain provisions
that could not be violated, including minimum hours during the night,
minimum wage standards and the opportunity of an education.
This provision was abandoned in 1993, following pressure from the
United States which threatened to withdraw some trading privileges.
Additional pressure came from the ‘Child Labor Deterrence Act of
1992’, referenced above in the Bangladesh case, which called for a
ban on all U.S. imports made by child labor. Similar tactics of boycotting, not condoned by the working children, can be seen inside the
ICFTU as well. This increased pressure has forced many children to
work illegally, leaving them without protection of any kind.
In a world where decisions are often made quickly and without consideration for the potential consequences, something as delicate as
the well being of children should come under careful consideration
and scrutiny. Clearly, the Bangladeshi experience mentioned above
demonstrates that economic rights must be included in children’s
rights, as “this case illustrates the serious consequences of ignoring children’s economic rights in the rush to ban work by children”.
Thinking through the implications of a policy is always necessary.
The U.N., UNICEF and the world at large need to recognize the serious implications that come from enforcing the rules of the developed
world on a global level. The Western world cannot continue to
make global policy when they do not understand the reasons behind
the existence of the developing world’s problems. It is easy to say
that all children should go to school and not have to work, but for
countries heavily in debt, where school funding is scarce, this is easier
said than done. If children are going to work out of necessity, the
world owes it to them to protect their rights in a manner suitable to
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their situation. Otherwise, the world is not doing much to advance
the rights of the children most at risk.
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i . introduction

Relatively little attention is paid to economic human rights. The
justiciability of these rights is still under international debate, so it is
hardly surprising that there is no internationally agreed upon measure of countries’ protection of these rights. Scholars have developed
a number of indices that attempt to illustrate economic rights conditions, but these do not reflect governments’ capacity and willingness
to adequately protect these rights. This paper has two purposes:
the first is to construct a measure of governments’ economic rights
practices compared with their capacity to provide economic rights.
The second is to examine possible policy variables that may explain
variations in levels of economic rights practices, including government expenditures on health, education and military, level of exports
of goods and services, inequality, debt servicing, and the presence of
International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs.
ii . economic rights

Economic rights are sometimes not considered human rights at all. A
criticism of economic rights is that “[they] have been defined primarily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively” and the drafting
of a separate covenant for these rights “reflect[s] an assessment of
the practical difficulties that states would face in implementing generalized norms requiring substantial time and resources” (Dennis and
Stewart, 2004). However, it has not been empirically proven that
economic rights are more expensive to protect than other human
rights (Donnelly, 2003).
Most Western countries such as the U.S. have historically embraced
civil and political rights while excluding economic rights when addressing human rights in law and practice. For example, the U.S. has
ratified the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
but has not ratified the United Nations Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
International agreements such as the CESCR provide a theoretical
framework in which to address economic rights but fail to articulate
standards of government economic rights practices that would be
useful in enforcing those rights (Robertson, 1994). The covenant
also lacks a clear enforcement mechanism. A measure of economic
rights practices is crucial to adequately monitor governments’
implementation of espoused policies. Governments too frequently
claim extensive legislation and policies that are intended to protect
economic rights, but the end result is that these policies are not put
into action. A measure that targets government economic practices
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may be more useful in analyzing policy and directing future efforts in
improving economic rights conditions.
iii . social rights as a prerequisite for economic rights

The indicators chosen for the measurement of economic rights in
this study are based on the underlying assumption that social rights
are a prerequisite for economic rights. The Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights states:
…a State party in which any significant number of individuals is
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is,
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant [to
fulfill economic rights]. (OHCHR, 1990)
If a person is starving, they lack the capacity to work. If a person is
denied adequate healthcare, they are not able to fully maximize their
freedom to work. This assumption shapes the choice of economic
rights indicators in this study. This notion also illustrates the fact that
economic rights are undeniably linked to resources.
This assumption also opens the debate about economic rights
fulfillment and its relationship to a country’s wealth. Economic rights
measures that use wealth as an indicator of economic rights practices
are unfair to poor countries. Furthermore, that type of measure
offers no opportunity for cross-country comparison; poor countries
will inevitably score lower than rich countries in their economic
rights practices. Therefore this study uses GDP/capita to indicate a
country’s ability to protect economic rights, not as an indicator of a
country’s economic rights practices.
Hence resource use is a key part of the study of countries’ economic
rights practices. The CESCR is the most widely accepted articulation of economic rights. It includes the right to work, the right of
everyone to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, fair wages
and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction
of any kind and that provides for a decent standard of living, and the
right of everyone to a decent standard of living. Article 2, Section 1
of the covenant states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
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means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
(OHCHR, 1966)

This broad statement makes it difficult to measure a country’s
compliance in protecting economic rights. How do we measure state
compliance with the obligation “to the maximum of its available
resources?” The committee emphasizes “even where the available
resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a
State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the
relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances” (OHCHR, 1990).
iv. measurement problems

There are many obstacles to developing a good measure of economic rights that is both accurate and universally accepted. Insufficient
or misreported data is one of the greatest challenges. For example,
unemployment statistics are largely absent from developing countries
data, and particularly in agrarian societies, the seasonal nature of
agricultural production leaves most people unemployed for at least
some part of the year. In rich countries such as the U.S., the Human
Poverty Index is not reported. Inequality is another statistic that has
significant gaps of missing data. Furthermore, researchers collecting data often rely on second-hand sources such as news reports;
for example new reports of torture convey not actual incidences of
torture, but the incidences of news reports of torture (Barsh, 1993).
Determining which indicators are most important in measuring
economic rights is also problematic. Quantifying concepts such as
the right to work and the right to health may appear to be a simple
task, but in reality the chosen indicators may or may not measure the
concepts they are supposed to represent (Barsh, 1993). Researchers often pick and choose indicators based on which ones correlate
most to their hypotheses instead of indicators that will produce the
most accurate results, and therefore produce biased results in their
studies.
Assigning appropriate values to indicators is another area where
researchers make mistakes. Since an appropriate measure must be
simple and easy to construct, assigning weights to indicators can
oversimplify the actual economic rights conditions in a country.
Charles Humana’s World Human Rights Guide includes a measurement of “social and economic equality for ethnic minorities” in the
Americas for which there were three scores: full respect, some
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violations, and substantial violations (Humana, 1986). These three
categories are broad and unrealistic, particularly in assuming that
some countries score with full respect. No country is perfect, but in
order to measure the economic and social rights conditions, Humana
must discount certain violations in order for the measure to be
simple enough to be applied universally.
Many of the measures that have been developed focus on other
human rights, particularly physical integrity rights such as the right to
live free from torture. Measures that focus exclusively on economic
rights include the work of Cingranelli and Richards (2004) and Kimenyi (2005). Cingranelli and Richards measure government respect
for economic rights using the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI),
while Kimenyi uses the United Nations Human Development Index.
Both examine the residuals in their regressions that regress the PQLI
against GDP to determine the level of government willingness to
protect economic rights.
v. measure background

The proposed measure in this study builds from Cingranelli and Richards’ basic contention that government respect for economic rights
is a function of both ability and willingness (Cingranelli and Richards,
2004). Ability reflects the available resources a government can use
to protect economic rights, and willingness reflects how willing they
are to direct those available resources towards the protection of
economic rights. In this study we use GDP/capita to reflect the available resources a government can use to protect economic rights.
A measure of economic rights practices must include an indicator for
the economic rights conditions in the country. Standard of living indicators are an adequate proxy for economic rights conditions because
there is a strong correlation between poverty and economic rights
conditions. People who do not have basic needs such as food or
adequate health care cannot fully exercise their economic rights. This
notion is based on the relationship between economic and social
rights discussed earlier in the paper.
Measures most frequently used to reflect standard of living and
poverty are development indicators such as the Physical Quality
of Life Index (PQLI) and the United Nations Human Development
Index (HDI). The PQLI encompasses infant mortality, life expectancy
at age one, and basic literacy (UNDP, 2004). The HDI measures
life expectancy at birth, knowledgeability as embodied by the adult
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literacy rate and gross school enrollment at all levels, and GDP per
capita (UNDP, 2004).
Development indicators are strongly correlated with national wealth,
implying that poor countries will inevitably score lower on economic
rights protection than richer countries. This relationship is extensively documented in development research and is the unfortunate
reality for poorer countries. Therefore, it is unfair to measure economic rights protection without accounting for countries’ ability and
available resources to protect those rights.
Both PQLI and HDI measure standard of living, but they do not capture all the aspects of poverty that relate to economic rights. PQLI
reflects levels of health and knowledge, but does not reflect whether
people enjoy a decent standard of living. Furthermore, because the
infant mortality rate and life expectancy at age one reflect levels of
health, this aspect of economic rights is double counted. The HDI
includes GDP/capita as one of its component indices, but since this
study attempts to analyze income and its relationship to standard of
living, we cannot use an indicator that is based on income.
The UN Human Poverty Index (HPI) used in this study summarizes
deprivations in longevity as measured by the probability at birth of
not surviving to age 40, deprivations in knowledgeability as measured
by the percentage of illiterate adults, and deprivations in a decent
standard of living as measured by [BOTH] the percentage of people
without sustainable access to an improved water source and the
percentage of underweight children below age five (UNDP, 2004).
The HPI’s measure employs the same aspects of human development as HDI but reflects a wider range of variables that define
poverty without using GDP/capita. This gives a better estimate of
the level of economic rights protection. In addition, the HPI weights
deprivations in each of the three areas – health, education, standard
of living – equally unlike the PQLI. The value of the HPI ranges from
zero, implying no one in the population is deprived in any of the
three areas, to 100 implying that everyone is deprived in all three of
the areas. The value of the HPI can be interpreted as the average
percentage of the population that experiences deprivation in one of
the areas. By subtracting the HPI from 100, one obtains an indicator
of the average percentage of the population that enjoys economic
rights fulfillment in one of the three areas.
vi . hiv/aids

Another important variable that influences a country’s ability to

namaste

56

protect economic rights is HIV/AIDS prevalence. This factor is most
often noted briefly, and at worst completely overlooked as a factor
influencing a government’s ability to provide a decent standard of
living and to protect economic rights. The devastating impact of
HIV/AIDS affects all aspects of human and economic development.
Countries with the highest levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence experience
decreases in economic growth by as much as 1 to 2 percent (Population and Development Review, 2001). HIV/AIDS severely reduces
governments’ capacity to respond to social needs beyond immediate treatment. HIV/AIDS has a disastrous impact on the capacity of
Governments to deliver basic social services. Human resources are
lost, public revenues reduced and budgets diverted towards coping
with the impact. (Population and Development Review, 2001)
HIV/AIDS also affects poverty variables included in HPI such as
health, education and standard of living. Countries with the highest
levels of HIV/AIDS have seen increases in under-five mortality rates
and lower life expectancy at birth. Education and literacy rates are
affected as teachers die and orphans whose parents died from HIV/
AIDS drop out of school. Food security is also reduced as HIV/AIDS
affects food production.
There are a number of factors that affect a government’s ability to
provide a decent standard of living to the poorest in its population
besides national income and HIV/AIDS prevalence, however, the
overwhelming impact of HIV/AIDS on all aspects of society and its
rapid spread make it a unique variable. The unlikeliness of a present
solution to cure HIV/AIDS, the costliness of treatment, and the huge
reversals in economic and human development it causes warrants it
special attention when assessing a country’s ability to fulfill its citizens’
economic rights.
vii . proposed measure

The proposed measure in this study of a government’s willingness
to direct available resources towards securing it’s citizens’ economic
rights is derived by estimating:
100 – HPI = a + b(GDP/capita $PPP) + c(GDP/capita
$PPP)2 + d(HIV prevalence) + e.
GDP/capita $PPP and HIV prevalence reflect governments’ ability to
protect economic rights. GDP/capita $PPP squared is used to illus-
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trate the curvilinear relationship between GDP/capita and standard
of living in which standard of living rises as GDP/capita increases at a
decreasing rate. I use 100 – HPI to reflect the portion of the population that is not poor and enjoys economic rights. The residual signifies the government’s willingness to protect economic rights. If the
residual is positive, that means the country’s government raised the
standard of living and level of protection of economic rights more
than would be expected given its ability. If the residual is negative,
the government has done worse than would be expected given its
available resources. Cingranelli and Roberts, as well as many others,
have analyzed the residual as an indicator of performance in this
context.
In considering government willingness, government’s may be more
than willing to devote resources to protect economic rights but may
not see positive results. Governments may be exerting great effort
towards implementing economic rights, but due to other factors may
not be successful. Our measure of economic rights therefore is more
a measure of effective policy implementation and practices signified
by the term “willingness.”
Data on only 177 countries was available from the United Nations
Development Program 2004 Human Development Report (UNHDR). Data on the HPI is available for 80 member countries.
viii . results from regression
model

1

1

unstandardized
coefficients

constant
gdp/cap
gdpsqu
hiv

standardized
coefficients

b

std.
error

beta

57.759
.006
-1.982E-07
-.890

2.191
.001
.000
.161

1.357
-.875
-.363

t

sig .

26.357
9.061
-5.870
-5.514

.000
.000
.000
.000

a Dependent Variable: 100-HPI
The regression shows a strong relationship between HPI and the
variables GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, and HIV prevalence. As predicted, the results from our measure clearly indicate a
statistically significant positive correlation between per capita income
and standard of living. As GDP per capita rises, 100-HPI initially rises
but subsequently falls once per capita income rises above roughly
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PPP $15,000. Also, there is a strong statistically significant correlation between HIV prevalence and HPI. HIV prevalence negatively
affects the standard of living and the economic rights conditions in
the country.

gdp/capita

100-HPI and GDP/capita

36,600
26,150
26,910
10,880
8,840
7,130
6,590
5,870
4,610
3,580
3,230
6,590
2,270
980
1,690
2,130
520
missing
missing
missing

30

100-hpi
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Appendix A contains the list of countries and their residuals. Unfortunately, since the majority of industrialized nations do not have data
on HPI-1, their residuals are not included in this study. These include
Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland,
the United States, Japan, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
Finland, Austria, Luxemburg, France, Denmark, New Zealand, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Israel. The UNHDR report also excludes the
following UN member countries for which HPI cannot be computed:
Afghanistan, Andorra, Iraq, Kiribati, the Democratic Republic of Korea, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, and Tuvalu.
Also, a number of other countries from various development categories do not have residuals listed due to missing data. However,
among the countries included, there is wide variation in residuals,
with some performing much higher than their ability and a few performing much worse. Most notably, Bolivia has the highest positive
residual, 14.68514, reflecting it’s top performance in protecting economic rights, and Oman has the largest negative residual, -32.2304,
the worst economic rights score.
These scores are interpreted as reflecting governments’ economic
rights practices. Defining the residual in such a narrow sense may be
problematic; the residual is meant to represent all unexplained variables in the equation. As noted earlier, “willingness” may include factors other than government inclination to direct available resources
towards protecting economic rights. However, since there is a strong
correlation between GDP per capita and HPI, and HIV prevalence
and HPI, it is less risky to interpret the residual as a variation of those
variables. The strong statistical significance implies that the residual
may be interpreted as a variation of government respect for economic rights. Furthermore, the residuals also capture measurement
error unrelated to a country’s ability to provide economic rights.
ix . policy variables

The second purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the factors that affect countries’ performance in protecting economic rights.
“Willingness” embodies the government’s willingness, policy success,
and other variables that may affect the economic rights conditions
in a country. Governments need to implement the right policies that
are actually effective in providing for economic rights. Defining the
factors that influence policy success is difficult because they are not
tangible; many unquantifiable, but key aspects, are political environ-
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ment, corruption, and underdeveloped institutions. However, focusing on government expenditures as a percentage of GDP is useful in
developing a framework to understand the residual in our measure.
Looking at the expenditures as a percentage of GDP also corrects
for differences in cross-country wealth, providing a more fair analysis.
Health and education expenditures are frequently used as indicators of the government’s willingness to raise the standard of living.
This study uses data on public health expenditure as a percentage of
GDP $PPP, public expenditure on pre-primary and primary education as a percentage of GDP $PPP, [AND] public expenditure on
education as a percentage of GDP $PPP; this data is taken from the
United Nations Development Program 2004 Human Development
Report (UNHDR).. The UNHDR defines public health expenditure
as current and capital spending from government (central and local)
budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from
international agencies and non-governmental organizations) and
social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.
The UNHDR defines public education expenditure as both capital
expenditures (spending on construction, renovation, major repairs
and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and current expenditures (spending on goods and services that are consumed within the
current year and would need to be renewed the following year). It
covers such expenditures as staff salaries and benefits, contracted or
purchased services, books and teaching materials, welfare services,
furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rents, telecommunication and travel.
On the other hand, military expenditures may reflect the government’s unwillingness to direct available resources towards raising the
standard of living and protecting economic rights. It is noted that
some governments are forced to maintain a high level of military expenditures due to civil and international conflict; however, it remains
an important indication of the direction of public funds. Military
expenditures as defined by the UNHDR include all expenditures of
the defense ministry and other ministries on recruiting and training military personnel as well as on construction and purchase of
military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the
expenditures of the donor country.
Inequality is also a variable that may affect the standard of living.
The adverse affects of inequality are well documented. Fundamental
aspects of development including openness, institutions, and educa-
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tion are the means through which the middle class raises its level of
income and standard of living.
The evidence suggests that the positive association between middle
class share and economic development…is due to a causal effect of
the former on the latter…[H]igh inequality [is] a large and statistically significant hindrance to developing the mechanisms by which
economic development is achieved. (Easterly, 2002)
Inequality is a barrier to raising a country’s standard of living because
it fuels underdevelopment in areas such as nutrition, education, and
health. Asset inequality in particular, and especially of human capital,
disproportionately affects income growth of the poor. A more even
distribution of assets increases the income of the poor and directly
reduces poverty (Birdsall and Londono, 1997). High levels of inequality can also become barriers to employment as individuals come to
believe that efforts to improve their human capital or compete in
the market would be futile. Therefore there is substantial evidence
to hypothesize that inequality may be a mitigating factor in explaining
the level of protection of economic rights. This study uses the Gini
index taken from data in the UNHDR (2004).
Debt service as a percentage of GDP is also a policy variable that
may explain differences in levels of economic rights. For poorer
countries, diverting limited funds towards debt service may have a
devastating impact on the standard of living and level of economic
rights enjoyment. Countries owing the most debt face higher levels
of malnutrition, infant mortality, disease, and illiteracy than other developing countries at comparable per capita income levels (Maguire,
2000). These countries that seek loans in the first place tend to have
pre-existing low levels of growth and high levels of poverty, and debt
servicing further exacerbates the poverty conditions.
It is now well established that debt is incompatible with, and in fact
deleterious to, human development. The central message…is that
the current levels of debt among heavily indebted poor countries
have severe negative consequences for human development,
because external debt servicing requirements limit the resources
available for investments in human development and discourage
economic growth. (Maguire, 2000)
Many poor countries divert significantly more resources towards
debt servicing than on social services such as health and education.
African governments spend an average of four times more on debt
repayments to northern creditors than they spend on health and
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education. The Philippines spends 30% more of its national budget
on debt servicing than on social services. Other countries with similar ratios include Brazil, Cameroon, Jamaica and Zambia (Maguire,
2000). Examining debt payments as a policy variable affecting economic rights protection may help explain variations in the country
residuals. This study uses debt service as a percentage of exports of
goods and services for the year 2002. This provides an opportunity
for cross-country comparison with debt service as a proportion
of national income. The data are taken from the UNHDR, which
defines debt service as the sum of principal repayments and interest
actually paid in foreign currency, goods or services on long-term
debt (having a maturity of more than one year), interest paid on
short-term debt and repayments to the International Monetary Fund
(UNHDR, 2004).
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) response to poor countries’
economic crises may also have an effect on economic rights protection. The IMF’s structural adjustment programs that seek to help
countries solve balance-of-payments crises, achieve macroeconomic
growth and reduce poverty are the target of extensive criticism.
Critics claim that the IMF’s programs actually increase poverty and
underdevelopment. MacLeans and Mangum (2001) discuss structural adjustment programs’ impact on sub-Saharan Africa:
[A]djustment and stabilization programs tend to endanger human resource development. Even more telling, social conditions and human
development considerably worsened, with the deterioration in the
areas of education, health, employment and income, with especially
serious effects on children, school graduates and women. (Macleans
and Mangum, 2001)
These effects on standard of living are not surprising given that
structural adjustment programs raise prices of goods and services by
removing government subsidies for basic consumption items including food, transport, and energy. Local currencies are devalued which
raises real prices for imported goods and services, and unemployment increases because of public and private cutbacks in firms who
are forced to scale back in the face of newly introduced foreign
competition. Social services are also decreased. These changes have
a profound impact on the standard of living of the most vulnerable in
society. The presence of IMF structural adjustment in countries may
have a unique impact on the levels of economic rights protection.
To test this hypothesis, a “dummy” variable was created. Countries
under an IMF program currently or within the past five years were
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assigned a value of 1, while all other countries were assigned a value
of zero.

∞

X. Regression 2
To examine the effects of the policy variables on the level of economic rights protection the following is estimated:

y

= ∂ + ∑lßl Xl + 3			
l =1

where y is the residual from regression 1, Xl are the policy variables
of concern, ßl their estimated coefficients, ∂ the intercept term, and 3
is the error term. The eight policy variables are as follows:
health government expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP
prime gdp government expenditures on pre-primary and primary
education as a percentage of GDP
education government expenditures on education (all levels) as a
percentage of GDP
military government expenditures on military as a percentage of
GDP
export exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP
gini gini coefficient
debt debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
imf under an IMF program currently or within the last five years

xi . regression

2 results

model

1

unstandardized
coefficients

constant
health
prime gdp
education
military
export
gini
debt
imf

standardized
coefficients

b

std.
error

beta

-8.217
.489
-.027
1.162
-1.218
-.029
.201
.094
2.594

9.890
1.799
.056
2.565
1.025
.128
.239
.110
5.262

.082
-.356
.316
-.314
-.058
.293
.244
.128

t

sig .

-.831
.272
-.490
.453
-1.188
-.224
.840
.855
.493

.420
.790
.632
.657
.254
.826
.415
.407
.630
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The results from the regression show very little statistical significance
of the effects of the policy variables on the residual. This evidence is
contrary to our hypothesis that these variables can significantly explain variations in government protection of economic rights. These
results, in regards to the policy variable inequality are surprising given
the extensive literature that exists concerning the effects of these
variables on standard of living. The contradictory results in this study
may be due to the presence of missing data that can result in less
correlation between the variables and the residual.
To remove any distortions caused by multi-colinearity, I regressed
each policy variable on the residual separately. This produced similar
results in which there was no statistical significance in each regression.
Empirically, this study shows that the policy variables government
health, education and military expenditures, exports of goods and
services as a percentage of GDP, inequality, debt servicing as a
percentage of exports, and the presence of IMF structural adjustment programs, explain very little about differences in government
economic rights practices. However, these relationships may require
further study.
xii . conclusion

This study has shown that government practices of economic rights
protection can be measured by regressing GDP per capita, GDP per
capita squared, and HIV prevalence on 100 minus HPI and examining
the residual. The measure gives a prediction of a government’s ability
to protect economic rights based on GDP per capita and HIV prevalence. Deviations from this predicted value reflect a government’s
willingness to protect economic rights with the sign of the residual
indicating whether they perform better or worse, given their ability.
I have developed a measure that is simple and allows for cross-country comparison correcting for differences in national income. The
evidence shows that economic rights are positively correlated with
GDP per capita and negatively correlated to HIV prevalence.
Since there is such a high correlation between the independent
variables and 100 minus HPI, I conclude that the error term in the
equation explains variations in economic rights protection. However,
I have also attempted to explain differences in government economic
rights practices by examining policy variables that have a potential
impact on the level of government protection of economic rights.
These policy variables included government expenditures on total
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education, pre-primary and primary education, health, military, and
exports of goods and services, as a percentage of GDP, inequality as
reflected in the Gini index, debt servicing as a percentage of exports,
and the presence of IMF structural adjustment programs from 19952000. Although there proved to be no statistical significance in the
relationships between these variables and the residuals from regression 1, this may be due to the presence of substantial missing data.
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appendix a
hdi
ranking

country

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Norway
Sweden
Australia
Canada
Netherlands
Belgium
Iceland
United States
Japan
Ireland

residual
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ranking

country

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Switzerland
United Kingdom
Finland
Austria
Luxembourg
France
Denmark
New Zealand
Germany
Spain
Italy
Israel
Hong Kong, China (SAR)
Greece
Singapore
Portugal
Slovenia
Korea, Rep. of
Barbados
Cyprus
Malta
Czech Republic
Brunei Darussalam
Argentina
Seychelles
Estonia
Poland
Hungary
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Bahrain
Lithuania
Slovakia
Chile
Kuwait
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Qatar
Croatia
United Arab Emirates
Latvia
Bahamas

70

residual

9.49848

-2.36967

-0.14059
1.95657
5.08319

hdi
ranking

country

residual

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Cuba
11.93207
Mexico
-3.31494
Trinidad and Tobago
-0.35705
Antigua and Barbuda
Bulgaria
Russian Federation
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
-5.8837
Malaysia
Macedonia, TFYR
Panama
6.65852
Belarus
Tonga
Mauritius
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Suriname
Venezuela
8.51081
Romania
Ukraine
Saint Lucia
Brazil
-2.59395
Colombia
5.40319
Oman
-32.2304
Samoa (Western)
Thailand
-0.94549
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Jamaica
13.87928
Lebanon
10.99695
Fiji
-5.04692
Armenia
Philippines
6.20236
Maldives
Peru
5.04343
Turkmenistan
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
.
Turkey
0.81323
Paraguay
Residual
Jordan
Azerbaijan
9.22951
Tunisia
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93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Grenada
China
Dominica
Sri Lanka
Georgia
Dominican Republic
Belize
Ecuador
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Occupied Palestinian Territories
El Salvador
Guyana
Cape Verde
Syrian Arab Republic
Uzbekistan
Algeria
Equatorial Guinea
Kyrgyzstan
Indonesia
Viet Nam
Moldova, Rep. of
Bolivia
Honduras
Tajikistan
Mongolia
Nicaragua
South Africa
Egypt
Guatemala
Gabon
São Tomé and Principe
Solomon Islands
Morocco
Namibia
India
Botswana
Vanuatu
Cambodia
Ghana
Myanmar
Papua New Guinea

72

residual

-7.59504
6.39496
5.60502
-0.19586
-0.6963
12.02752
-4.4816
1.89063
10.14964
9.88268
-6.81558

7.63222
10.14072
14.68514
13.31675
13.68009
10.82521
-8.15317
0.06283

-11.6642
-5.31914
-2.7995
-9.29911
7.39307

hdi
ranking

country

residual

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Bhutan
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Comoros
Swaziland
Bangladesh
Sudan
Nepal
Cameroon
Pakistan
Togo
Congo
Lesotho
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Yemen
Madagascar
Nigeria
Mauritania
Haiti
Djibouti
Gambia
Eritrea
Senegal
Timor-Leste
Rwanda
Guinea
Benin
Tanzania, U. Rep. of
Côte d’Ivoire
Zambia
Malawi
Angola
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
Central African Republic
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Guinea-Bissau
Burundi
Mali

12.08818

-9.27893
2.6585
-6.36402
0.53256
-10.215
-0.3652
9.13901
7.01766
1.71206
-0.81166
4.92227
-2.92815
3.61793
7.04494
-17.5832
-2.81369
-11.8478
-2.22422
-9.92923
-5.05644
-7.82333
10.73562
-4.99485
1.7363
4.74244
-8.86902
-0.65303
-0.04036
.
-2.64575
.
-1.8384
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hdi
ranking

175
176
177

country

residual

Burkina Faso
Niger
Sierra Leone

-20.2568
-25.7392
-22.6611

appendix b
descriptive statistics

100- hpi
gdp/capita
gdp/capita^2
hiv prevalence
total health
expenditure
total education
expenditure
primary education
expenditure
military expenditure
exports
gini
debt
imf
valid n (listwise)

namaste

74

n

minimum

maximum

mean

std. deviation

94
174
174
142
175
134
93
127
162
127
116
177
23

34.50
520
270400.00
0
0
1
23940.00
0
7
24
1
0

97.50
61190
3744216100.00
39
8
11
1767780.00
24
151
71
69
1

71.8989
9231.13
184674900.3621
2.57
3.46
4.53
431613.3849
2.67
40.55
40.16
14.65
.23

16.07724
10001.801
394735025.42271
6.136
1.742
1.992
354877.62092
2.807
23.904
10.323
12.079
.423
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benjamin a . linhard

The threads we wear

about beanjamin

Benjamin is a freshman majoring in history at the
University of Connecticut. His aspirations are to attend
law school and become a prosecutor. He also wants to
eventually become involved in politics.
In his creative writing essay “The threads we wear”
Benjamin juxtapositions his own experience as a young
sales clerk at Sears with an account of the working conditions of those who made the merchandise which he is
selling. Through this creative device, Benjamin educates
the reader about his/her own complicity in a system of
economic injustice.
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It is 9am. As I speed towards work, I realize that I am supposed to
be at work at nine. Oh well, I will be five minutes late, I doubt my
manager will care. I turn into the parking lot of Sears and hurriedly
park my car. I hate working at this time, it is so early. My manager is
pretty flexible, so I feel bad complaining about a 9 a.m. shift. I’m sure
in a few years, once I complete my education, I will always be working at 9 a.m. I walk into the employee entrance and punch in. Then
I head to my station in the Shoe Department. I go towards the cash
registers and start them up since I am the first one here in the morning. There are no customers, so I sit back on the counter. This job is
pretty laid back. Usually business is relatively slow except around the
holidays and back to school season. During those seasons management usually makes sure there are plenty of treats such as, free subs
and pizza for everyone in the break room. Since I am opening in
the shoe department it is my responsibility to make sure everything
looks sharp for our customers. As I walk through the department I
inspect the rows of Nikes, Reeboks and the various brands we sell.
These shoes came from far away. The big boxes they come in are
usually stamped with places like Port of Shanghai or Port of Singapore. The people that make these shoes live an entirely different life
than I live. Not just because they are from a different country but
they also work in harsher unimaginable conditions.
The shoe factories are located in some of the world’s poorest countries (www.sweatshopwatch.org). China, Indonesia, Haiti, El Salvador,
Dominican Republic, are some of the names on the list. The workers in the factories are poorly paid, often between fifteen and thirty
cents an hour (Ross 24). At times the amount they are paid works
out to less because management will skim some off the top (Ross
113). They do not receive pay stubs and are paid in cash (Ross 98).
This ensures there are no records; without any evidence, no criminal
complaint can be brought against the manufacturers. The workers
who make the actual product typically receive less than one percent
of the product’s retail value (Ross 111). They can barley afford food,
housing in a shack, and clothes for themselves (Ross 105).
Yes, these sweatshop laborers are unskilled and therefore probably
the least important people in the chain since anyone can do their
job. Despite being the base of every apparel company, the workers
don’t even earn one percent of the products value. I don’t think it
would be too much for rich company executives to increase their
manufacturers share by just a little bit. It might mean putting premium gas instead of super premium gas in their fancy sports cars, but
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I think it is a definite possibility.
Pay day for me is pretty simple. I have direct deposit, so beginning at
12:01 am every other Friday I can log onto www.sears.com and view
my pay stub electronically. I can save it in PDF format for further
review on my computer, or I can print it out and have a hard copy.
Then I log onto my bank account and see the deposit just made from
Sears Roebuck and Co. I can immediately access the new funds with
my debit card, or I can wait till 9 a.m. in the morning when the bank
opens.
In addition to their incredibly low salaries, the sweatshop workers
are cruelly treated and work long hours (Ross 103). The slightest infractions typically result in an immediate termination of their employment (Ross 98). If they are not fired, then they are beat, whipped
or tortured. Sometimes they are beaten because their supervisor
is in the mood (Ross 113). The females are sexually harassed and
raped (Ross 113). They have excessively high quotas to meet, and the
sweatshop supervisors have little sympathy for those who are under
parity (Ross 101). They work in dirty, dusty and dangerous conditions
(Ross 105). They are yelled at for daring to use the restroom (Ross
105). The most horrific fact is that a good portion of the workers
are children (Ross 113). As I look upon the shoe wall at Sears and
see how squeaky clean each pair is, I find myself wondering how they
could have come out of factories so dirty. No, factory is too good of
a term to describe these sweatshops. It does not convey the truth
that the sweatshops famous brands are manufactured in should
never pass any sort of inspection in our country.
		
I imagine that the executives of the manufacturing companies on
the wall are sitting in the back of limousines as they make their way
to work. Those executives have probably had a healthy breakfast
with great tasting coffee, or maybe a cappuccino. They probably live
in splendid opulence. Their mansions might be as big as the shanty
towns where the people who make their shoes reside. But why
shouldn’t they live in such affluence? I mean don’t they deserve it?
In the last twenty years they have skillfully cut costs by transporting
thousands of decent paying American factory jobs to third world
countries where the workers are paid a tiny fraction of what their
American equivalents made. Meanwhile thousands of Americans
were put out of work, and when they managed to find new work
they generally worked for less money (www.sweatshopwatch.org).
Factory pay dropped by two percent between 1992 and 1997 while
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the executives in charge received raises around 500% (Ross 9).
I wonder what a typical day for a teenage sweatshop worker would
be like. From my research in No Sweat by Andrew Ross and www.
sweatshopwatch.org I can gather that it is a very unpleasant day.
He rises early in the morning to get his own breakfast if he has any
at all. His parents, if he is still with them, are probably very poor
(Ross 103). He lives in wretched conditions with poor sanitation and
bacteria everywhere. He is uneducated, it is too expensive, and it
would take up working time anyways (Ross 103). He works hard for
fourteen to fifteen hours, with a short lunch break (Ross 103). He
must physically burn himself in order to meet high quotas. When he
doesn’t meet his quotas he is likely beaten (Ross 98). At the end of
the day he stumbles home, with enough energy to eat and sleep. In
order to gain energy for another hard day.
The workers tried to improve their conditions, by forming unions.
Or at least they tried to get laws passed that would give them some
protection. Unfortunately, unionizing for these sweatshop workers
is like Americans trying to get the minimum wage to be a hundred
dollars an hour. It just is not practical with their current conditions.
The first impediment for unions is the lack of government support.
The governments themselves often brutally suppress unions (www.
sweatshopwatch.org). If the government does not directly suppress
the unions it does so by ignoring the sweatshop managements’ suppression efforts (Ross 116). If the unions do succeed, the companies
just close shop and relocate to another location without unions
(www.sweatshopwatch.org). Management often hires assassins and
death squads to deal brutally with the leaders of unions (Ross 116).
The sweatshop supervisors maintain a computerized database of
suspected union members with photographs and fake names (Ross
87). It is impossible to get a job if you are in the computer blacklist.
It is amazing how extensive the efforts at union suppression are in
many of the third world countries. It is the sweatshop managements’
grim recognition of the fact that if their workers are allowed to
unionize similar to workers in America, it would mean the end of
brutally cheap labor and skyrocketing incomes for management.
		
The L.V. Myles factory in Haiti is a subcontractor for Disney. Charles
Kernaghan, a senior official in the National Labor Committee went
there and recorded some impressions and testimony from sweatshop workers there. One laborer commented that “they [management] treat you like garbage. They don’t look at you as a human
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being, but as a piece of shit. The owners wont even talk to us, and
if they don’t like your face or you’re sick, they fire you” (Ross 101).
The laborer is required to complete 200 pieces of clothing every
hour. “The supervisors pace the assembly lines clapping their hands
and shrieking at the workers to go faster” (Ross 101). “At the end of
the day all the workers are exhausted” (Ross 101).
I am allotted plenty of breaks. Today I am working the longest shift;
it is scheduled for eight and a half hours , so I get two fifteen minute
breaks and one half hour break. Sometimes I sneak in an extra break
if I’m tired because the managers don’t really care as long as you
don’t leave when the department is busy, or if you’re all by yourself.
During my break I am able to do many things. I can watch TV, read
a newspaper, or just chill in the break room. If I feel like it I can walk
around the store and shop, or I can walk through the mall go to
other stores. Sometimes I drive home and play video games on my
break. My breaks are pretty relaxing; my biggest complaint is I wish
they had couches in the break room to take a nap.
The executives of the famous manufacturing companies have much
to be happy about. They live lavishly and labor issues are not a
source of stress for them. For most twenty-first century apparel
executives, labor issues means impoverished countries will work
for the least amount of money. The bulk of their labor force is non
union. In fact technically it’s not even their labor force. They have
trickily worked through a system of contractors and sub contractors
so that they can deny guilt (Ross 111). When public pressure mounts
to improve wages and conditions, the executives can say they are
trying hard and sending inspectors, but after all it’s not really their
workforce so they can’t directly resolve the issues. Yet, the subcontractors themselves can’t afford to change things because their
contracts with the big designer companies are usually low priced. If
they attempt to negotiate a fairer price, the designers simply go to
another contractor. (www.sweatshopwatch.org).
At the N.S. Mart factory which is another Disney subcontractor,
Kernaghan recorded some more testimony. “The workers told us
the plant is hot, dusty, and poorly lit. Some complained about having
trouble with their eyesight and respiratory problems” (Ross 98).
Sexual abuse is rampant. One worker said a manger named Hillarie
is the worst, “you either give in to him or you are fired” (Ross 98).
Every worker Kernaghan talked too readily testified to being short
changed on his pay. (Ross 98). A mother who had three kids said all
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her children were sick, and she was unable to afford the medicine
to cure them (Ross 97). Their toilet was a hole in the ground shared
with ten other families (Ross 97). No wonder her children were ill;
there was bacteria and germs everywhere. Her children were weak;
they often went days without dinner. Instead of eating they would
just go to sleep.
After the CEOs drastically cut production costs, they continued to
mark up the shoes and their companies’ profits skyrocketed (Ross
26). These CEOs have taken their increased profits and reinvested
them into paying celebrities like Michael Jordan, millions of dollars to
endorse their products. Celebrity investments makes their products
even more marketable. In 1992 Michael Jordan earned more than
Nike’s entire Indonesian workforce combined (Ross 9). Maybe from
a business perspective the CEOs deserve a five hundred percent
pay raise, but they have ruined the lives of almost every decent hard
working American and many foreign workers in the process. These
executives look at the charts, steep line graphs, and see record
profits,but they don’t see what was lost to make them. These successful soft lines executives (as shoes and clothes are referred to at
Sears) have ignored all casualties to achieve their goal.
		
I continue my day at Sears. I just got off my half hour lunch break
where I had a sandwich. It was pretty good. As I go back to the
warehouse to retrieve some shoes, I realize that the warehouse is
the closest I will get to a sweatshop. It is pretty dark and dusty. The
ladders are a little rickety, and I’m always a little nervous climbing
to the top of them. My imagination is a gigantic stretch from what a
real sweatshop is like, something I hopefully will never experience. I
finish my day a little tired, but happy and confident that more money,
and the correct amount, will be in my bank account soon.
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